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ARTICLES� 
Rorty on Pre-Linguistic Awareness in Pigs 
Richard Rorty's book Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature 1 has been 
one of the most important works in 
philosophy in the last decade~ in one 
chapter on "Pre- Lingu istic Awa reness" 
(pp. 182-192) Rorty holds that we 
ought to abandon the "Platonic urge" 
to ground our moral prohibitions on 
an ontology of natu re. This claim is 
important in its own right and as an 
instance of Rorty's defense of herme­
neutics. Apparently, Rorty's discus­
sion is not so much intended to be a 
justification of a position as· a diagno­
sis of how we think about and deal 
with pre-linguistic beings, especially 
non - human an imals. But eventually 
this diagnosis reaches a conclusion 
. which needs justification, that "we 
send pigs to slaughter with equanim­
ity. . this is not 'irrational'" (p. 
190). In this paper I claim that Ror­
ty's treatment of non -h uman animals is 
not sufficient to establish the case for 
meat-eating, as Rorty seems to think. 
Although Rorty never treats meat-eat­
ing explicitly, I assume that pigs are 
primarily slaughtered in order to be 
eaten. 
Rorty, in an analysis of Sellars, 
admits that some non-human beings 
(e.g., rats, amoebas, computers - p. 
182) are capable of awareness, and 
some human beings without language 
can experience pain e.g., infants - p. 
183). But language for Rorty (contra 
Sellars), although it does not change 
the quality of our experience, does let 
us enter a community whose members 
can exchange justifications of asser­
tions (p. 185). This is not a commu­
nity of feeling, but a linguistic com­
munity in which rights are dependent 
on a person's relations with others to 
whom (or to which) he can speak (p. 
187). That is, moral prohibitions 
against hurting others, the nature of 
a moral commu nity, and the g rou nds 
for ascribing rights are not dependent 
on facts of natu re, Ii ke sentience; to 
believe in a community of feeling as 
the basis for moral prohibitions is to 
fall victim to the dreaded "Platonic 
urge" (p. 191). Rather, moral pro­
hibitions and rights are attributed on 
the basis of a being's membership in a 
linguistic community. 
For Rorty, the non -conceptual, 
non-linguistic knowledge of what a 
raw feel (e.g., pain) is like is attrib­
uted on the basis of a being's poten­
tial membership in the social practice 
of a linguistic community (pp. 
188- 189) . "Babies and the more 
attractive sorts of animal," like bats 
(7) and koala bears, are credited with 
"having feelings" whereas photoelec­
tric cells, pigs, spiders, and amoebas 
are not so credited. This "community 
feeling" (in Rorty's linguistic sense) 
unites us with anything humanoid. 
To be humanoid "is to have a human 
face, and the most important pa rt of 
that face is a mouth which we can 
imagine uttering sentences." That is, 
we can imagine babies opening their 
mouths and speaking about the pres­
ence of pain, but we cannot imagine 
spiders or pigs doing so. 
The point that Rorty wants to make 
is that moral prohibitions against 
hurting babies are not "ontologically 
grounded" (p. 190) in their posses­
sion of feeling. In fact, it is the 
other way around. We do not move 
from an awareness of feelings in oth-· 
ers to moral prohibitions designed to 
protect these others, but rather from 
moral prohibitions to an attribution of 
feeling: 
The moral prohibitions are 
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expressions of a sense of 
community based on the 
imagined possibility of con­
versation, and the attribu­
tion of feelings is little 
more than a reminder of 
these prohibitions (p. 190). 
Rorty's account seems to be that: 
en If X is an actual or 
potential member of a lin­
guistic community, or if we 
attribute language to X, 
then it is wrong to hurt X. 
(2)� If it is wrong to hurt X, 
then X is an actual or 
potential member of a com­
munityof feeling, or we 
attribute feelings to X. 
(3)� To attribute feelings to X 
is only to remind ouselves 
that it is wrong to hurt X. 
Since Rorty is as important a phi­
losopher as ·there is in America today, 
he merits attention, no matter how 
implausible some of his accounts are. 
The following five points should be 
sufficient to cast doubt on his view of 
pigs and to support my claim. 
A. The fi rst difficu Ity with Ror­
ty's account arises when he admits 
that pigs do much better on intelli­
gence tests than koalas (p. 190). 
Why, then, do we attribute having 
feelings fo koalas but not to pigS?2 
Because "pigs don't writhe in quite 
the right humanoid way, and the pig's 
face is the wrong shape for the facial 
expressions' which go with ordinary 
conversation" (p. 190). One suspects 
that the "attractive" humanoid fea­
tures of koalas are arbitrary grounds 
for attributing feelings to them but 
not to pigs. I for one, and I am not 
alone, do not find koalas (or bats!) 
more "attractive" than pigs; nor can I 
more easily imagine them speaking 
than pigs. 3 Rorty's description of 
the way In which "we" care about 
koalas but not pigs amounts to a fac­
tual empirical claim that is not univer­
sally true. 
B. On Rorty's grounds one won­
ders how he can legitimately say that 
pigs "writhe." If to writhe means, as 
the OED suggests, "a twinge of pain". 
or "to contort the body, limbs, etc., 
as from agony, emotion" (my empha­
sis), then how can Rorty say pigs 
writhe? Since they lack attractive 
humanoid features, or mouths that we 
can imagine speaking, we should not, 
on Rorty's account, be able to. attri­
bute pain, agony, or emotion to them. 
C. Rorty may try to escape objec­
tion (B) by appealing to his two dif­
ferent senses of awareness. Aware­
ness-1 is manifested by. rats, 
amoebas, computers, and presumably 
pigs, and consists merely in "reliable 
signaling" (p. 182). Awareness-2 is: 
. .. manifested only by' beings 
whose behavior we construe as 
the utterance of sentences with 
the intention of justifying the 
utterance of other sentences. 
In this later sense awareness 
is justified true belief - knowl­
edge - but in the former sense 
it is ability to respond to stim­
uli (pp. 182-183). 
If Rorty is suggesting that a pig's 
writhing is only awareness-1, then his 
attribution of feelings to koalas, bats, 
and babies (not pigs) must mean that 
koalas, bats, and babies are capable 
of, or we can imagine them capable 
of, awareness-2. Once again, this 
seems arbitrary, especially when Ror­
ty's use of the term "behavior" is 
noticed in the above quote. As far as 
I know, koalas and bats exhibit no 
behavior that pigs do not exhibit that 
can be construed "as the utterance of 
sentences with the intention of justif­
ying the utterance of other sen­
tences." Nor is it clear that infants 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4 
exhibit such behavior. Therefore, 
Rorty's imagined possibility of conver­
sation with bats and koalas would be 
based solely on the shape of their 
mouths. Further, to lump rats and 
pigs, on the one hand, together with 
amoebas and computers, on the other, 
is misleading. One finds it difficult, 
if not impossible, to imagine what it 
would mean to say that a computer 
writhed, and hence had pain, agony, 
or emotion. Yet is is so easy to say 
that a pig can writhe that even Rorty 
says so. 
D. I have twice accused Rorty of 
arbitrariness, to which he might 
respond that the cha rge of a rbitra ri­
ness is irrelevant since any distinction 
regarding who should have rights is 
somewhat arbitrary. The case of ani­
mals is similar, he might say, to his 
example of adult rights descending on 
a person on his eighteenth birthday 
(p. 187). There is nothing that is 
clear-cut about this date, but after 
the eighteenth birthday there is a 
shift in a person's relations with oth­
ers. Line-drawing may be "injudi­
cious," but it is neither a mista ke nor 
irrational. What might be unfair, for 
Rorty, would be to give adult rights 
to all eighteen year olds, except for 
some chosen people, who wou Id have 
to wait until they were thirty. He 
might analogously argue that it would 
be fair, though arbitrary, to slaugh­
ter pigs, but u nfai r to ma ke excep­
tions for some. pigs. 
This stance is troublesome for sev­
eral reasons. While picking the 
eighteenth bi rthday as the date for 
acquisition of adult rights is arbi­
trary, because there is no precise 
time at which people, in general" 
become suited for the possession of 
such rights, it is not arbitrary to say 
that most people should not be given 
them at age five and should al ready 
have been given them by the age of 
forty. There is no reason to pick the 
day a person becomes eighteen rather 
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than the day before or the day after 
his bi rthday, but any of the th ree 
would obviously be far better than the 
fifth birthday or the fortieth birth­
day. So also, shrimp and oysters, as 
Singer notices,4 are in a grey area 
where our decision as to whether or 
not they have pain is concerned; and 
if they do have pain,whether it is 
wrong to hurt them. But pigs are 
not in such a' grey area, as Rorty 
unwittingly admits when he notices 
their writhing. 
E. To send a being to slaughter 
involves a decision, which Rorty not 
on Iy ma kes, but ma kes in the case of 
pigs with "equanimity." This might 
imply only that the person who sends 
pigs to slaughter is calm and com­
posed, and is not irrational. The 
word equanimity, however, as defined 
by the OED, carries with it the notion 
of "fairness of judgement, impartial­
ity, equity" (my emphasis), which 
indicates anything but' arbitrariness 
since fairness are equity are, by def­
inition, opposed to arbitrariness. If 
it is fair to slaughter a pig, or a 
matter of equity, then Rorty must do 
two things. Fi rst, he must avoid the 
charge of arbitrariness, and not just 
in the minimal sense of slaughtering 
some pigs but making exceptions for 
others, i.e., he must find a non-arbi­
trary basis for slaughtering pigs at 
all. And second, he must at the same 
time avoid the "Platonic urge" to make 
his position non-arbitrary by an 
appeal to some fact of nature. It is 
hard to see how Rorty can accomplish 
either one of these tasks, much less 
both. Or, he might try to avoid 
objection (E) altogether by refraining 
from the use of the term "equanim­
ity. " 
Although I will not offer anything 
like an adequate alternative to Rorty's 
account of pre-linguistic awareness in 
pigs, I would like briefly to suggest 
how one might give in to the "Platonic 
urge" without building moral 
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prohibitions on "old style" metaphy­-
sics. Rorty's own noticing of pigs' 
writhing indicates that pigs do com­-
municate in thei r own way. Although 
Rorty may be right, along with Hegel 
(p. 192), that the individual human 
being apart from society (and espe­-
cially, for Rorty, its linguistic con­-
ventions) "is just one more animal," it 
does not follow that it is legitimate to 
inflict unnecessary suffering on "just 
one more animal." Pigs and other 
animals indicate to us through writh­-
ing that they are' not capable only of 
awareness-1, even if they fall short of 
awareness-2. Pigs are also capable of 
experiencing pain, as Rorty might 
have to reluctantly admit. It is just 
not true that human language is the 
only (or at times, the most reliable) 
guide to the feelings, interests, or 
pains of other beings. In the case of 
human beings language can disguise 
facts as well as communicate them. If 
a dog's whimpering and clawing at the 
door cannot inform one of the animal's 
need to go out then neither can the 
student's verbal and plaintive request 
that he has to go to the bath room. 
In fact, the student may be lying. 
Rorty seems to have fallen victim to 
the dogma that there is a vast gulf 
between natural and conventional 
(humanoid) bearers of meaning, giving 
rise to the gulf between the ways we 
treat (non-humanoid) animals and 
men. At best this gulf is a difference 
in degree. 5 Perhaps he should con­-
sider that many, if not most, of the 
attributions of pain we make to other 
human beings are not based on artic­-
ulated evidence, but on writhings, 
moans, the sight of blood, etc., all of 
which are exhibited by pigs. In the 
meantime, it seems that Rorty has not 
so much destroyed the mirror of 
natu re as clouded it. 
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Richa rd Rorty, Philosophy and 
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Princeton University Press, 1979). 
2 I am not assuming a necessary 
connection between intelligence and 
feeling; I am only searching for Ror­-
ty's criteria for the attribution of 
feeling. 
3 Even on an imaginative level 
Rorty's account seems defective; note 
the popularity of the cartoon charac­-
ter Porky Pig, or of Mi ss Piggy, who 
talks incessantly. 
" Peter Singer, Animal/ Liberation 
(N.Y.: N.Y. Review, 1975), p. 188. 
5 I am relying here on the work 
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Especially see Rollin's "Beast and 
Men: The Scope of Moral Concern," 
Modern Schoolman/  55 (March, 1978). 
Also, I would like to thank the read­-
ers of an earlier version. of this arti­-
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